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EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF COMMON LAW
EFFICIENCY: REASONS FOR (COGNITIVE)
SKEPTICISM
ADAM J. HIRSCH*
Professor Jeffrey Stake’s article on legal evolution raises important, even tantalizing, questions from the perspective of behavioral
theories of law.1 Those theories have emphasized the intellectual
frailties of human persons—frailties that cloud judgment and lead
decisionmakers astray, sometimes in systematic ways. The extent to
which persons nonetheless allocate optimally their scarce cognitive
resources is a subject of ongoing debate today within the field of cognitive psychology.2 Be that as it may, the finding that decisions reflect the bounded rationality, rather than global rationality, of the
persons who make them distinguishes cognitive psychology from economics and, by extension, behavioral analysis of law from conventional law and economics.
From a behavioral perspective, recognition of the potential for irrationality by citizens can serve to justify paternalistic rules that operate to limit choice, and thereby to protect citizens from the regret
that would accompany poor decisions.3 Yet the cognitive deficiencies
of judges themselves—being every bit as human as the persons
whose suits they hear—suggest that they, too, are apt to make imperfect choices. As concerns their lawmaking function, judges’ efforts
to craft ideal common law rules are doomed to failure4—a failure that

* William and Catherine VanDercreek Professor of Law, Florida State University.
M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987 Yale University. Thanks to Gregory Crespi, Shubha
Ghosh, Chris Guthrie, Paul Rubin, and Jenia Iontcheva Turner for helpful comments.
1. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential
Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
& PROC., May 2004, at 408; Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, Bounded Rationality to the
World, 24 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 143 (2003).
3. The literature on this subject is now vast, as the notes accompanying articles
within this Symposium attest. On the paternalistic implications of behavioral analysis of
law, see Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 17-22 (1995); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541-45
(1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 1165 (2003); and Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229,
254-75 (1998). Compare Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003), with Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
4. I explore the implications of bounded rationality for the lawmaking process in
Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003) [hereinafter
Hirsch, Jurisprudence]; and Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1057, 1144-62 (1996) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inconsistency]. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else
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(by analogy) paternalistic mechanisms can forestall only in limited
respects.5
Accordingly, scholars who posit that judges generally aspire to establish efficient rules6 cannot thereby conclude that the common law
tends ineluctably in that direction. Those scholars must take into account the pressures of time and shortcomings of ability that degrade
judicial decisionmaking. Anything concocted by the human mind—
including law—betrays the infirmities of that mind. At any rate,
common experience with common law suggests that judges have varied, and often eclectic, tastes7—including, increasingly, a taste for
policies inspired by the subject matter of this Symposium.8
Thoughtful design is not, however, the only means whereby human artifacts can come into being. Many artifacts actually derive
from chance discovery or protracted processes of trial and error. Necessity is the mother of experimentation, as well as invention, and
through such means artifacts can be said to evolve—as forms of life
evolve—through undirected processes of natural selection. Over long
spaces of time, this remarkable engine imbues nature’s handiwork
with a degree of inadvertent perfection, of apparent design, that no
mortal designer could begin to replicate (which is not to say that
even nature is perfectly perfect9). Some artifacts display the very
same characteristic.10
All of this has intriguing implications for theories of legal change.
Economists maintain that the market comprises a blind mechanism
that drives traders toward efficient production of wealth. The state of
their minds becomes irrelevant because traders take their cues from

Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002);
Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002).
5. Under a system of separation of powers, some of those paternalistic mechanisms
must be, more precisely, self-paternalistic. The self-imposed doctrine that dicta are not
binding provides an example. See Hirsch, Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 1366-67.
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.2, at 532-33 (6th ed.
2003).
7. Even Judge Posner concedes that “there is more to justice than economics.”
Id. § 2.3, at 28.
8. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and
Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
213, 218 & n.21 (2000); Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1065, 1145 n.162.
9. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, The Panda’s Thumb, in THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE
REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 19, 24 (1980).
10. See HENRY PETROSKI, THE EVOLUTION OF USEFUL THINGS 211 (1992) (“[A]s has
been the case throughout history, craft and engineering advances could and often did proceed even in the absence of scientific explanations.”). For an early recognition of the power
of protracted trial-and-error, allowing, for example, a “complicated[,] useful and beautiful”
ship to be built by a “stupid mechanic,” see DAVID HUME, DIALOGUES CONCERNING
NATURAL RELIGION 130 (Stanley Tweyman ed., Rutledge New ed. 1991) (1779).
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the invisible hand.11 If common law likewise takes shape as a consequence of blind evolutionary processes, through “the system[’s] biases
of its own,” as Professor Stake puts it,12 then it possesses the potential to reach a degree of adaptability, a developmental sophistication,
that only a mindless process can achieve. From a cognitive perspective, law would burst the bounds of human rationality.
Ultimately, however, I remain unpersuaded by the analogy and
skeptical of the model. If the common law features some elements of
an evolutionary system, it is also, through and through, a participatory system. Human participation cannot but leave its indelible
stamp.13
*

*

*

To be sure, one can identify a fundamental similarity between the
dynamics of a common law system and a natural system. Each includes an apparatus for self-replication. In nature, that apparatus is
the DNA molecule; in law, it is the jurisprudential principle of stare
decisis. But the direct parallel between the dynamics of the two systems pretty much ends there. In nature, a large population of organisms contains stable polymorphisms and, at each generation, a small
number of spontaneous genetic mutations. Those organisms compete
with one another for survival, producing adaptations in response to
environmental change.
Within a hierarchical legal system, the opportunity for legal
polymorphisms and mutations is quite limited. Once a rule is
adopted by the high court, the replicative apparatus of precedent is
especially strong and conservative in suppressing variations within
the manifold lower courts. Only in cases of first impression can alternative rules coexist in lower courts—and even then, those alternatives do not proceed to compete with each other in a blind way; in due
course, the high court will select one alternative or another on the
basis of reasoned choice. Once the high court has ruled on an issue,
the common law for the jurisdiction is set. There is a relevant “genetic” population of one and no store of diversity to meet new threats.
11. An individual trader in a market “neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it.” 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannon ed., Univ. of Chicago Press
1976) (1776).
12. Stake, supra note 1, at 406. For a recent survey of evolutionary theories of law,
see Paul H. Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient?, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS (Francesco Parisi & Charles Rowley eds.
forthcoming 2005), reprinted with revisions in Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
13. In this respect, my thesis parallels analyses by cognitive theorists who conclude
that the blind pressures of an economic market generally will not suffice to extinguish irrational behavior by traders. See, e.g., Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of
Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1071, 1074 passim (1985).

428

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:425

The evolutionary mechanisms conjectured by legal scholars differ
structurally from the mechanism of natural selection. The one most
closely akin to the model of natural selection, sometimes termed “differential investment,”14 posits that parties with more to gain from a
favorable rule will tend to invest more in the litigation contest than
their adversaries with less at stake, leading inexorably in the direction of the rule that creates the greatest wealth (and hence efficiency). Over time, the more efficient rule becomes the “fitter” rule
and survives because it is backed by greater adversarial resources.
Even in a population of one, where no alternative rule is extant, the
relentless pressure of periodic, lopsided litigation exerts itself upon
an inefficient rule until eventually it gives way.
Even taking for granted the hypothesis that judicial lawmaking
operates in the manner postulated, responding to the functional
equivalent of market signals,15 one can identify a number of soft
spots in this theory. Those soft spots appear even when we assume
global rationality and probe the model with the traditional tools of
law and economics.16 Of course, the amount any particular litigant
stands to gain from a rule change bears no necessary relation to the
amount that all potential litigants would gain—a random element
that theorists get around by assuming (not unreasonably?) that, on
average, the ratios of individual gains and losses will correspond
with the ratios of aggregate gains and losses.17 There is also the problem that rules are sticky. Whereas the prospect of greater wealth
creates incentives to pour money into litigation, the doctrine of
precedent stacks the adversarial deck against a party who seeks to
revise a rule, whether or not the existing rule is efficient. Hence, advocacy of a rule change should prove more costly than defense of
precedent. Theorists have acknowledged this point by limiting the
differential-investment model to instances where rules are sufficiently inefficient initially to overcome the structural bias in favor of

14. Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the
Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 156 (1980).
15. Of course, any number of institutional protections function nowadays to insulate
judges from direct economic incentives, but that does not mean they are impervious to intellectual influence. Proponents of this model are not so bold as to assert that judicial lawmaking goes to the highest bidder, only that “any increment in legal expenses c will induce
an increment, however small, in the probability π of winning a favorable decision.” John C.
Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393,
394 (1978).
16. I am hardly the first observer to raise critical objections to these theories. See, e.g.,
Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 584-85 passim
(1992) (arguing that common law rules are reconsidered within cases that form a biased
subset of the varied, potential disputes to which the rule applies, and for which the rule
may or may not achieve efficiency—a criticism the author applies to both advertent and
inadvertent models of lawmaking dynamics).
17. See Goodman, supra note 15, at 404-06; see also Stake, supra note 1, at 407-08.
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stasis.18 Yet, the difficulty remains that common law change can occur, and historically has tended to occur, incrementally.19 If we factor
incrementalism into the instant model, then we would expect common law rules to move toward efficiency, and then to cease moving at
some point short of efficiency, once the marginal cost of dislodging
the next increment of precedent begins to exceed the marginal gain
anticipated by the rule change.
The stickiness of rules presents a second obstacle to legal efficiency. When persons contemplate investing in litigation, they must
also decide how to allocate their capital between analysis of law and
development of facts. Given the stickiness of legal doctrine, rational
parties should often find fact development more cost-effective. Hence,
litigation “portfolios” might lean systematically toward producing efficient outcomes, without generating efficient rules.
Still another difficulty stems from the circumstance that, to the
extent parties can bid for them, common law rules comprise public
goods: those who pay for rules cannot prevent others from sharing in
their use. Individual parties therefore have a rational incentive to
underinvest in rules, hoping they can instead free ride on the expenses borne by other, similarly situated parties.20 Once again, theorists acknowledge this problem,21 although they need also to consider
how it is magnified in the special context of litigation: Parties divide
their investment between the public good of law and the development
of facts, which remains a private good that others cannot share. This
second investment outlet should enhance rational incentives to curtail production of public goods.
And all of this comes before we get to problems of irrationality!
The instant model of common law evolution assumes judicial conduct
in rulemaking to be mechanistic, following the money, so to say, but
the model nevertheless presupposes conscious deliberation at an earlier stage by parties to the litigation. Hence, the differentialinvestment model remains adulterated by an element of cognition:
From a behavioral perspective, the model moves us out of the frying
pan and into the fire.
Consider status quo bias, the demonstrated tendency of persons to
value what they already own more than the prospect of gaining

18. See Goodman, supra note 15, at 394-95, 405.
19. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 70-74, 105-18
(1988). For an earlier recognition by an astute observer, see S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. On the economics of public goods, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968).
21. See Goodman, supra note 15, at 405-06. Collective action could solve the problem,
but different interest groups have varying abilities to operate collectively. Id.
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something else of equal value.22 Persons grow accustomed to the
things—and to the rights—they possess and tend relatively to overvalue those things and rights, even if they would prefer other ones
were they starting from scratch.
In other words, familiarity breeds content. Status quo bias should
cause parties to place a premium on the legal status quo, be it efficient or inefficient.23 However fundamental to economics, the assumption that persons assess the wealth created by rights objectively
finds no support in cognitive psychology.
Along with assessments of gain and loss, litigation entails assessments of risk. And, here again, we must contend with cognitive
illusions. Consider the availability heuristic, the tendency of persons
to estimate the probability of an event by virtue of how readily instances of that event spring to mind.24 Such a thought experiment
leads persons to exaggerate the relative frequency of unusual, and
thereby vivid, events, while underestimating that of the mundane. In
connection with litigation, instances in which courts overrule common law decisions ought to be more salient than those upholding
precedents, leading parties to envision rules as more unstable, more
protean, than they actually are. This illusion might lead parties who
would benefit from a rule change to underestimate the investment
necessary to attain that goal; vice versa, those parties who benefit
from an existing rule may be led by the same illusion to overinvest in
defending the status quo.
If status quo bias and the availability heuristic add (in different
ways) to the friction impeding legal dynamics, any number of other
cognitive—and, for that matter, cultural, emotional, or sociobiological—forces could affect litigation expenditures randomly, thereby
contributing to the aimlessness of the common law. Consider one
more example: the sunk-cost effect.25 People’s sense of endowment in
investments they have made, moneys already sunk into a scheme,
22. For a survey of the copious literature on this subject, see JONATHAN BARON,
THINKING AND DECIDING 288-91 (3d ed. 2000). But cf. Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler,
The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (questioning the existing body of evidence).
23. Within economic theory, path dependence comprises a rational echo of status quo
bias: The expense private parties would have to bear to convert to a new legal rule can
outweigh its efficiency. For judicial recognitions of path dependence as a policy justification
for legal stasis, see Hirsch, Inconsistency, supra note 4, at 1157-58 & n.295 (1996); and
Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of Doctrinal
Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 532 n.19 (2000). See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System,
86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-62 (1996).
24. The literature is surveyed in BARON, supra note 22, at 141-43.
25. Id. at 297-300.
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induces them to invest more if necessary to prevent the sums already
expended from being “wasted.” Hence, once in for a penny, persons
are disposed to stay in for a pound.26 In connection with litigation,
the sunk-cost effect could trigger irrational bidding wars for favorable outcomes, as adversaries seek to protect sums they have already
invested to win the case.
Professor Stake identifies the fee tail as an inefficient common
law construct that may have owed its demise to evolutionary forces.27
Yet, as Stake acknowledges, the fee tail was also very popular!28
What could explain its popularity? Culture may have played a significant role, lending an aura of sacredness to ancestral property; or,
as Stake speculates, sociobiological impulses could have been involved.29 But there may also have been psychological forces at work:
Persons appear to derive satisfaction from the very act of exercising
control over things,30 and a fee tail maximizes one’s temporal control
over property.31 Psychologists have also observed in persons a desire
to sustain their identities beyond the grave,32 and a fee tail likewise
served this end, helping to preserve the memory and status of grantors, and thereby enabling them to achieve a kind of immortality.33
26. Professor Stake offers a contrary aphorism to suggest that “informal culture . . .
teaches us to ignore sunk costs,” Stake, supra note 1, at 404-05, yet experimental evidence
of the phenomenon is ample. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of
Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985) (reporting
the results of ten experiments).
27. Stake, supra note 1, at 410-19.
28. Id. at 410, 415-17.
29. Persons are genetically predisposed to benefit their offspring (the phenomenon of
“nepotism”), and the selfish gene is unconcerned about overall efficiency. Professor Stake
suggests that by preserving wealth for future generations of descendants, a progenitor
helps to ensure their reproductive success. Id. at 415. But cf. John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 255-58 (1981) (suggesting
that the selfish gene becomes indifferent to inheritance by collateral relatives once they are
sufficiently far removed as to be no more likely than an unrelated person to share that
gene—an indifference that should also set in, by analogy, with respect to remote generations of descendants).
30. MYLES I. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE H. LACKEY, JR., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN
CONTROL: A GENERAL THEORY OF PURPOSEFUL BEHAVIOR 3-19 (1991).
31. For an early recognition, see SIR ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 183 (London, Chatto & Windus 1880) (observing that dead hand control “is very commonly exercised to its fullest extent, merely because it exists, and without the slightest reason beyond
the pleasure of exercising power”).
32. Robert N. Butler, Looking Forward to What? The Life Review, Legacy, and Excessive Identity Versus Change, 14 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 121, 123 (1970); David R. Unruh,
Death and Personal History: Strategies of Identity Preservation, 30 SOC. PROBS. 340, 340-42
(1983). Modern terror management theory explains efforts to achieve “symbolic immortality” as buffers against the psychological anxiety caused by one’s awareness of the inevitability of death. Jamie Arndt et al., Terror Management and Self-Awareness: Evidence that
Mortality Salience Provokes Avoidance of the Self-Focused State, 24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1216, 1217 (1998).
33. For an early recognition, see HENRY HOME (LORD KAMES), HISTORICAL LAWTRACTS 142 (Edinburgh, A. Kincaid 2d ed. 1761) (photo. reprint 2000) (1758) (“The man
who has amassed great wealth, cannot think of quitting his hold, and yet, alas! he must die
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Today’s statutory successor to the fee tail, the dynasty trust, may
owe at least part of its popularity to these same psychological
forces.34
The fundamental point, however, is that bounded rationality condemns litigants to a cloudy understanding of their economic interests, irrespective of the legal issue at hand. In practice, parties can
be expected to invest in litigation on the basis not of technical economics, but of intuitive or “folk” economics, applying the human
equivalent of horse sense. If the differential-investment model was
dubious to begin with, cognitive theory drives more nails into its coffin.
*

*

*

The alternative model, sometimes labeled “differential litigation,”35 is no less problematic under both the economists’ and psychologists’ paradigms. The fundamental assumptions of this model
are that (1) inefficient rules prompt more frequent challenges than
efficient rules,36 and (2) courts overrule precedent infrequently and at
random. By hypothesis, under these conditions, efficient rules should
prevail for longer periods of time than inefficient ones.
The fact that law is a public good once again weakens the model,
which depends on litigants choosing to challenge inefficient rules in
greater numbers. As under the differential-investment model, any
one litigant has a rational incentive to hold back and free ride off of
the suits brought by other litigants.37 In the absence of (very difficult
and elusive) cooperation,38 the result could well be mass paralysis,
not mass litigation.
and leave the enjoyment to others. To colour a dismal prospect, he makes a deed . . . securing his estate . . . to those who represent him, in an endless train of succession. His estate
and his heirs must for ever bear his name; [the] very thing to perpetuate his memory and
his wealth.”).
34. See Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (examining the promotional literature for dynasty trusts); see also
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 548 (1964).
35. Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 139.
36. Ostensibly, law here achieves “fitness” by virtue of the number of its advocates,
rather than the strength of their individual suits. In nature, by analogy, species face a
trade-off between the number and strength of offspring, because organisms have limited
resources to devote to reproduction. DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 571-72
(3d ed. 1998). In the context of homo sapiens, see Kevin Majoribanks, The Sibling Resource
Dilution Theory: An Analysis, 125 J. PSYCHOL. 337 (1991). Because the resources of litigants are also finite, such a trade-off should also exist in the realm of litigation, suggesting
the possibility that the differential-investment and differential-litigation models are susceptible to theoretical consolidation.
37. For a theoretical admission of this problem as a weakness of the model, see Paul
H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 60 (1977).
38. In this context, an interest group would have to act not merely collectively but
also through coordinated actions by its individual members.
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In addition, consider how this process plays out within the prevailing, hierarchical legal system: Inefficient rules are relitigated initially in the lower court, which cannot “underrule” them, and then
decisions upholding precedent are appealed; the high court in the
vast majority of jurisdictions exercises discretion over which appeals
it will grant;39 and in order to divide its effort among the range of issues it is pressed to hear, the high court filters out repetitive cases.
Hence, at the acme of the legal system, where overruling can occur,
suits will not be tried in the same proportion as they are brought in
the baseline court; indeed, the frequency with which those suits come
before the high court may bear no relation at all to the frequency
with which they arise in lower courts.
And, once again, this is only the beginning; we need also to ponder
the implications of psychology. The assumption that inefficient rules
trigger more suits follows from the standard economic model of litigation. This model posits that if competing litigants value a suit
equally, they have a rational incentive to settle out of court rather
than bear litigation expenses (which comprise a reciprocal deadweight loss).40 If a rule is inefficient, on the other hand, the party
who would benefit from a rule change has more to gain from the litigation (given the prospective value of the alternative, efficient rule)
than the party who benefits from the existing, inefficient rule,
thereby reducing the opportunity for mutually beneficial settlement.41
Cognitive psychologists have cast doubt upon the soundness of the
standard economic model, questioning the ability of litigants to assess accurately the value of a claim, and hence their propensity to
settle a case, even if it would otherwise appear rational for them to
do so. Several researchers have bolstered their challenges with experimental evidence. On the one hand, self-serving (or egocentric) biases may encourage parties toward overoptimism—and thus to overvalue their respective claims, spurring litigation.42 Other psychological barriers to settlement include framing (whereby plaintiffs tend to
be risk-averse because they frame settlement as a gain, whereas defendants tend to be risk preferrers because they frame settlement as
a loss), equity seeking (whereby parties pursue moral vindication of
their claims), and reactive devaluation (whereby parties wish to
39. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.5 (1981).
40. E.g., POSNER, supra note 6, §§ 21.4-.5, at 567-73.
41. Rubin, supra note 37, at 53-55. This analysis assumes that both parties are repeat
players who can benefit (or suffer) from the rule in the future. If both parties are one-time
players, they have a mutual incentive to settle irrespective of whether the existing rule is
efficient or inefficient. Id. at 56-57. For the scenario where only one of the two parties is a
repeat player, see infra note 46.
42. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 138-39 passim (1993).
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avoid appearing to capitulate to an adversary).43 On the other hand,
the phenomenon of regret aversion (that is, the desire to avoid the
experience of knowing and regretting that one has made a wrong decision) can help to produce settlement.44 And, once again, status quo
bias should render settlement of challenges to inefficient rules more
probable by enhancing the value of inefficient rights for those who
benefit from them, hence rendering them willing to pay more to retain them.45 This phenomenon could shift parties benefitting from inefficient rights up into the “settlement zone” where averting litigation becomes mutually attractive.
Put simply, the decision to settle a case vel non in human terms
translates into a matter of psychological complexity that finds no
parallel in the cold calculations of economics.46 Yet without those calculations, the instant model loses its power to predict patterns of litigation.
Of course, many parties make litigation decisions, concerning both
expenditure and settlement, in consultation with expert attorneys.
As professionals subject to market pressures of their own, those attorneys might be expected to develop some degree of immunity to irrationality, thereby dampening the irrational tendencies of the clients they advise. Some evidence supports this hypothesis.47 At the
same time, attorneys are human too. Several studies suggest that at-

43. For a discussion of all three phenomena, see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 107 (1994); and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 129 passim (1996).
44. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45-46 passim.
45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. Compare Professor Frank Cross, who argues that irrationality, especially in the
tort or product liability arenas, “has a positive effect on justness and efficiency in the law.”
Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-7, 24, 27 (2000).
Because product liability or other tort plaintiffs are typically one-time players with no interest in precedent, whereas defendants (such as manufacturers) may be repeat-players
with a continuing interest in precedent, defendants have more at stake than plaintiffs, impeding settlement until the law favors the repeat player, irrespective of whether that outcome is efficient. See Rubin, supra note 37, at 55-56 (constructing a general model). Professor Cross argues that irrational impediments to settlement on the part of plaintiffs help to
compensate for the imbalance of incentives. Cross, supra, at 19-24. Of course, that would
be true only in one band of the spectrum of common law suits. But even within that narrow
band, Cross’s analysis appears dubious: For plaintiffs and defendants are both subject to
the same, unpredictable irrationalities! Hence, irrationality should not have systematic
consequences, even in this context.
47. Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88
IOWA L. REV. 601, 638-44 (2003); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 95-121
(1997).
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torneys exhibit in particular the sorts of egocentric bias that psychologists have previously observed in lay subjects.48
Attorneys may also have rational incentives to offer irrational advice. Attorneys benefit by increasing their own incomes—which could
lead them to encourage all clients to invest more in litigation. On the
other hand, whether litigation or settlement redounds to the advantage of attorneys is less clear and could vary, depending upon the circumstances. But whenever agents act on behalf of principals, there
exists the prospect of agency costs—here operating potentially to
warp litigation decisions.49
In sum, any number of (not exclusively) cognitive phenomena may
function to distort decisionmaking by litigating parties, and thereby
to interfere with legal-evolutionary processes. The irreducible fact of
human participation in the common law process, here as litigant
rather than as lawmaker, undermines the potential for truly automatic, noncognitive processes of legal change to unfold. We must
nevertheless be careful to emphasize the limits of this critique: Cognitive phenomena do not operate systematically to create countervailing biases, channeling the common law in directions other than
efficiency. They merely introduce noise into the system, rendering
patterns of litigation erratic in the face of psychological crosscurrents. Hence, they may slow—but not halt—the drift toward efficiency predicted by existing economic models. Still, there must come
a point at which “noise litigants” drown out, for all intents and purposes, rational economic maximizers in the litigation marketplace.50
Whether that point has been reached cannot readily be hypothesized,
although it might be susceptible to empirical investigation.
*

*

*

Moving beyond theory, brief inspection of the common law provides abundant evidence of its production by decisionmakers with
48. Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 86065 (1995) (citing to prior studies); Richard W. Painter, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a
Closing in Arthur Solmssen’s The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1128-33
(2000).
49. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 47, at 121-24 (citing to studies). On the theoretical problem of agency costs, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976).
50. Notice that because lawsuits are inalienable, no opportunity for arbitrage—
squeezing out irrational litigants—exists within the litigation market. See Michael
Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); see also Denis
J. Hilton, Psychology and the Financial Markets: Applications to Understanding and
Remedying Irrational Decision-Making, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS
273, 274-75 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (suggesting that markets containing irrational traders can still be efficient). But cf. J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise
Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 705 passim (1990) (suggesting
that noise traders disrupt even financial markets that contain rational arbitrageurs).
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human characteristics. The very fact that common law varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, confirming a theoretical prediction of cognitive theory,51 appears to belie the efficiency hypothesis. Assuming
local conditions do not dictate different efficient rules, a minimum of
all but one of those variations must be inefficient. Similarly, within
any given jurisdiction, the substance of the common law betrays
manifold inconsistencies between structurally similar rules, as cognitive theory would again predict.52 These rules cannot simultaneously
be efficient. Still another cognitive phenomenon reflected in the
common law is salience bias. “Salience biases refer to the fact that
colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionately engage attention and accordingly disproportionately affect judgments.”53 This bias produces a legal pathology that is the mirror image of structural inconsistency: When a new problem appears superficially similar to another one that has already been resolved by a
vivid common law rule, judges sometimes replicate the vivid rule
thoughtlessly, again producing suboptimal law.54 In still other ways,
the common law displays features that are telltale signs of underlying cognitive phenomena, diminishing the potential for efficiency.55
This is not to say that common law dynamics are devoid of any
evolutionary component. In particular, the progressive development
of exceptions to rules suggests that processes of trial and error do
yield legal improvements. Hence, rules initially announced in overbroad terms become refined over time.56 This process need not operate automatically, however; it is fully explicable as an epistemic exercise, whereby lawmakers perceive what appear to be doctrinal errors and strive, however imperfectly, to correct them.

51. By hypothesis, these inconsistencies stem from “selective search” by lawmakers as
a necessary aspect of attention rationing. Hirsch, Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 1337-42.
52. This phenomenon also follows from selective search. See id. at 1338-39. For an extended discussion, see Hirsch, Inconsistency, supra note 4.
53. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982); see also, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 178-80 (1993).
54. One example was the historical extension of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities from the arena of bequests to persons, where it made sense in general terms of public policy, to the arena of bequests for purposes, where it made no sense at all. Evolutionary processes have not eroded this fallacious duality. For a discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch,
Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 84-87 (1999). For
other illustrations of the same structural phenomenon, see, for example, Pamela Bucy,
Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1095, 1114 (1991); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 804-08 (1983); and
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2002).
55. I discuss manifestations of one of these—to wit, task-interference within lawmaking—in Hirsch, Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 1342-58.
56. Id. at 1340-42.
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And even if mechanistic processes of legal evolution were discovered to exist, we can identify one other human element in the story
that should function to thwart them.57 Whereas biological evolution
takes place within what is, for the most part, a gradually changing,
natural environment, legal evolution occurs within a rapidly changing cultural and technological environment.58 A rule that is welladapted to society one day may not be the next. Like the Red Queen,
rules have to rush twice as fast just to keep up. In a mercurial world,
any ineluctable tendencies toward efficiency must often prove insignificant because they will be overtaken by the race of events.59
When the natural environment undergoes rapid change, as occasionally happens, it can overwhelm the evolutionary process. The result is mass extinctions, which have occurred periodically in the history of life on earth.60 When shifts in the social environment cause
law to become recognized as ineffectual, the overarching, nonmechanistic aspects of the system (which are missing from the natural system) assert themselves unmistakably: Advertent lawmaking
occurs.61 We may observe that common law jurisprudence anticipates
and allows for this very eventuality—hence the common law maxim,
cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.62 And, of course, legislators can
also intercede as catalytic agents to update obsolescent common law.
This was an element in the history of the fee tail, which at various
times has been a creature of common and statutory law.63 But advertent lawmaking also brings us back to the realm of human foibles
and fallibilities.
Indeed, it bears noting that even this systemic safety net can fail.
It can fail in the face of human neglect: The general field of future in57. In some instances, movement toward legal efficiency is stymied by constitutional
roadblocks. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (“Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice.”). But the same is true of nature, where the adaptive trends of species can run up against limits imposed by the laws of chemistry and physics. RICHARD
DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 190-91 (1986).
58. One is tempted to observe that the rate of social change is accelerating in the present age, but that is something of a myth. See KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF
HISTORICISM 160 (2d ed. 1960).
59. Cf. POSNER, supra note 6, § 21.6, at 574.
60. See generally MASS EXTINCTIONS: PROCESSES AND EVIDENCE (Stephen K. Donovan
ed., 1989).
61. Compare Professor Epstein, who argues that departures from established precedent within the common law more typically trace to judicial ideology than to social change,
which only occasionally affects the utility of rules. Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 253-73 (1980). From a structural perspective, however, this distinction is not all that significant: Obviously, no court establishes initially what it perceives to be a flawed rule. It is the dynamic ideological environment—
which can be conceived as an aspect of the social environment—that alters perceptions and
inspires advertent efforts to adapt the law to changing times.
62. E.g., In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 790 (N.C. 2003).
63. Stake, supra note 1, at 415-19.
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terests law, from which Professor Stake has drawn his principal illustration of legal change, gives every indication of having become
stranded in the past, by and large.64 Although law plainly has the capacity to adapt to the social environment, society just as plainly has
the capacity, for extended periods, to tolerate antique and inefficient
law.
And the safety net can also fail in the face of relentless change itself. The late Grant Gilmore, for example, famously confessed that
the Uniform Commercial Code was already obsolescent by the time it
was promulgated.65 If even thoughtful lawmakers sometimes lose
their race against time to maintain the law’s currency, then how
much less effective must be the gentler, thoughtless impulses for legal evolution operating in the background, especially when weakened
by the presence of irrational litigants?
*

*

*

The doubts and concerns expressed up to now have presupposed
a common law system as it currently exists—with a fixed principle
of precedent and a fixed, hierarchical organization of courts. But,
as any legal historian knows, nothing about law (at least since biblical times) is written in stone. Like rules, jurisprudence and legal
process also vary over time. And if the mechanisms of legal change
are themselves changeable, then the extent of the common law’s
tendency toward efficiency may likewise prove temporally dynamic.
In recent articles, several commentators have underscored this
point, claiming that the common law has been pushed in the direction of efficiency, and then in other directions, at different moments
in its history.66 According to one scholar, the common law has
64. The titles alone speak volumes: W. BARTON LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED! OR
THE PEOPLE VS. BLACKSTONE, KENT, GRAY, AND STARE DECISIS (ACCESSORIES: PONTIUS
PILATE AND THE LAWS OF THE MEDES AND THE PERSIANS) (1967); William F. Fratcher, Exorcise the Curse of Reversionary Possibilities, 28 J. MO. B. 34 (1972); Wythe Holt, The Testator Who Gave Away Less than All He or She Had: Perversions in the Law of Future Interests, 32 ALA. L. REV. 69 (1980); Taylor Mattis & David Schellenberg, The Doctrine of Worthier Title in Illinois: Burying the Dead, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1989); Ronald Maudsley, Escaping the Tyranny of Common Law Estates, 42 MO. L. REV. 355 (1977); Nicholas L.
White, Bringing Tennessee into the Twentieth Century Re Possibilities of Reverter, Powers
of Termination and Executory Interests when Used as Land Control Devices, 15 MEMPHIS
ST. U. L. REV. 555 (1985); Robert R. Wright, Medieval Law in the Age of Space: Some
“Rules of Property” in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REV. 248 (1968); Charles M. Agee, Jr., Note,
Has Tennessee Abolished Its Ancient Class Gift Doctrine or Only Modified It?, 7 MEMPHIS
ST. U. L. REV. 129 (1976).
65. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 627 (1981).
66. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common
Law: A Hypothesis, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2004); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of
Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003).
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tended most strongly toward efficiency when and where it has featured (1) overlapping tribunals, (2) in competition with one another
for business, where (3) parties commit to a tribunal before they
know whether they will comprise plaintiffs or defendants.67 Under
these conditions, parties’ choices among alternative venues provide
the selective pressure (quite literally!) for provision of optimal
rules.68 Observe, however, the unspoken cognitive assumptions of
this hypothesis: (1) most parties prefer, and hence select, rules that
feature the quality of efficiency (as opposed to distributive fairness,
or other qualities), (2) parties have the capacity to identify efficient
rules, and (3) parties have the time and mental energy to go ahead
and make the identification. We may call into question every one of
these assumptions.
In the wake of Erie,69 the opportunities for efficiency-generating
forum shopping within the American legal system have ostensibly
dwindled.70 Nevertheless, there remains at least one useful testing
ground for the hypothesis—to wit, corporate common law. In theory, competition for corporate charters should produce efficient
rules (at least as regards disputes between corporations, putting
aside the special problem of disputes between management—which
selects the situs—and shareholders).71 Here, indeed, there exist a
large number of “overlapping” jurisdictions to choose from, and corporations select their litigation situs before disputes arise, hence
behind a veil of ignorance. What is more, corporations have a strong
incentive (stronger perhaps than among private parties72) to favor
the jurisprudential ideal of wealth maximization. Yet, for all of
that, at least some commentators have doubted whether corporate
managers choose fora rationally. Professor John Coffee suggests
that Delaware’s success in attracting charters may in part have resulted from “herd” behavior:

67. Zywicki, supra note 66, at 1581-1621.
68. Id.
69. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
70. Zywicki, supra note 66, at 1621; see also id. at 1552.
71. State courts have no direct mercenary incentive to compete with each other, although the appointments process helps to create indirect incentives for judicial responsiveness. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 39-40 (1993)
(focusing on Delaware). In other contexts, where mercenary incentives are nonexistent,
modern versions of overlapping fora should not create tendencies toward efficiency, even
assuming all parties are rational. Thus, the rise of institutionalized alternative dispute
resolution has not triggered competition with courts to supply efficient legal process. On
the contrary, “the judicial trend is to encourage more rather than less arbitration and in
more diversified contexts,” precisely in order to achieve “docket reduction.” IAN MACNEIL,
RICARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 3.2.5, at 3:15
(1999).
72. For a recent inquiry into public attitudes, see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, An Empirical Inquiry into the Relation of Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Corporations may prefer to locate in a popular jurisdiction of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not
the inherent superiority of its law. Such a “safe” decision protects
the corporation’s advisers from criticism, pleases uninformed
shareholders who assume it is correct, and produces no adverse
reaction from a marketplace that cannot easily evaluate legal differences and so prefers the consensus choice.73

Similar sorts of information cascades, grounded in the cognitive costs
of determining legal optimality, could likewise impede common law
selective pressure in other situations and contexts.74
Even if there were some way around this problem, we must still
contend with the cognitive bottleneck of jurisprudence itself. For,
mechanistic processes aside, legal change remains advertent in the
sense that it occurs within the confines of a system of legal process
that is itself the product of human design, and that can be—and periodically is—redesigned. Hence, the efficiency of the common law
depends ultimately upon human decisions. And, for all appearances,
lawmakers’ larger operational decisions have been taken without a
thought to their implications for the generation of legal efficiency
over time;75 that tendency, to the extent it has existed, has invariably
comprised an epiphenomenon of other, more immediate concerns or
perhaps chance events—this being just another reflection of the
bounded rationality of the legal system’s human designers.
Still, could jurisprudence and legal process themselves respond,
peradventure, to blind pressures for the provision of efficient law,
thereby manifesting what we might dub meta-evolutionary tenden-

73. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 703 (1999). For a related discussion, suggesting that “the market is not capable of assessing the efficiency of a
legal regime,” see Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54
VAND. L. REV. 231, 269 (2001).
74. As suggested by Coffee’s brief critique, herding into a legal forum may be
prompted by incentives other than attempting to free ride on the cognitive expenses borne
by others. Such herding also insulates the advising attorney from criticism. “[I]t is better
for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.” JOHN M. KEYNES,
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 158 (1936), quoted in Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 355-56 (1996). Professors Kahan and Klausner assume the phenomenon represents an agency cost, Kahan &
Klausner, supra, at 355, but individual parties deciding for themselves might also fear
ridicule following an unconventional failure of judgment. See J. RICHARD EISER, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: ATTITUDES, COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 36-37 (1986). Finally, herding
may also reflect a “network externality”: The choice of one litigation situs over another
may be self-reinforcing, as that situs builds up a larger store of precedents and thereby increases legal certainty. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks
of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 841-47 (1995).
75. See Klerman, supra note 66, at 14; Zywicki, supra note 66, at 1621.
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cies?76 Professor Stake raises this possibility at the outset of his article, when he suggests provocatively that more successful legal systems are apt to supplant less successful ones in the competition between nation states, or in revolutionary struggles, leading in the direction of systems with the capacity to furnish society with optimal
law.77
Alas, this notion appears fanciful. Law adds an ingredient to the
overall strength of a state, to be sure, but all else is never equal.
When we come to “muscular economics,”78 the extent of resources becomes at least as important as the efficiency of their deployment, and
other factors, such as manpower, the presence of a motivating ideology, charismatic leadership, and a military esprit de corps come into
play. All in all, the importance of internal law in sustaining a regime
is hardly manifest.
Meta-evolution, then, offers no escape from the bounded rationality of common law. Irrationality will be bred out of our rules, and out
of our mechanisms for producing rules, only when it is bred out of us.

76. Sir Henry Maine may have anticipated the idea when he remarked cryptically
that “even jurisprudence itself cannot escape from the great law of evolution.” Quoted in
PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 100 (1980).
77. Stake, supra note 1, at 403. Consider also Professor Rubin’s suggestion that “the
reduced power of the state in common law systems” makes “more likely” the development
of competitive, overlapping jurisdictions. Rubin, supra note 12 (appearing in both versions
of the essay). Although states with common law have featured overlapping jurisdictions at
various times, there is no manifest historical trend toward their precipitation within those
states.
78. Professor Hirshleifer’s felicitous phrase. Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the
Force, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 2 (1994).

